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Knowledge and Life[1]

Give me understanding and I shall live. Ps. 119. 144.
This do, and thou shalt live.—St Luke 10. 28.

THESE sentences—if I may lift them out of their context, for my time is very limited—reflect two complementary responses to the world and to the demands of life—each incomplete without the other, each an act of faith.

Give me understanding and I shall live reflects the faith which has inspired and sustained men in the pursuit of knowledge and in successful investigation. If the human mind were not capable of understanding the universe in some measure and of making some sense out of our experience of life; if the universe were chaotic, irrational, with no trace of law and order, there would have been, there could be, no science worthy of the name. Faith in the understanding, and in the understandable-ness of the world in which our lives are set, is the very air that it must breathe in order to live and grow. So I agree with the professor of mathematics who said, "Science holds within it the stuff of religious experience", and again, "It is one aspect of God's presence, and scientists, therefore, are part of the company of his heralds".[2] The pietist who fails to see this is allowing himself to be misled by the modest garments of agnosticism in which the seeker after truth often drapes his faith, and sometimes hides it even from himself.

The method of observation, testing, comparison, common alike to all inquirers from the growing babe upwards, has, since the beginning of modern science in the matrix of Christian culture, been transforming human life, altering its pattern and texture. It has reduced mortality and increased longevity. It has enriched the content of living in greater or less degree for all mankind. It has brought within men's grasp powers which our ancestors never dreamt were possible. Which of us can foresee the increase of these powers when, for example, men will become able to understand the working of the human brain more accurately and fully than at present?[3] What potencies and increase of social well-being would not be possible *even now* if industry and government were to take the scientist into closer partnership?[4]

[1] A sermon at the Civic Service in Sheffield Cathedral on 2 September 1956 on the occasion of the meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

[2] C. A. Coulson, *Science and Christian Belief*, pp. 30 and 63.

[3] A fascinating popular exposition of this formed the subject of the Reith Lectures by Professor J. Z. Young in 1951 and published under the title *Doubt and Certainty in Science*.

[4] Cf. F. E. Simon, *The Neglect of Science*.

If faith in the orderliness and unity of the universe has made possible the growth of modern science, belief in the autonomy of the sciences and their freedom from external controls have been the condition of their rapid advance. The day of ecclesiastical controls is over, but the danger of political controls is very present, now that science and technology are entering into the economic and political spheres of life. The problem—the dilemma for society—is a real one. A wise solution will depend not a little on scientists and technologists themselves. Just as the early Christians were not in a position, and therefore did not have, to concern themselves about government and the ordering of society, so scientists in former days. But to-day, their moral responsibility towards society is no longer discharged by labelling the bottles and bombs "poison, to be handled carefully" and then leaving them about for any child, knave or fool to lay hands on! It is reassuring therefore to know that the Council of the British Association is alert to the new responsibility laid on its members in the contemporary situation.

Moreover, is it not important to remember that while knowledge, like beauty, is a desirable end in itself, yet *the* end is life? Life not in the abstract, but in the concrete: not just my life or yours, but the life of the community living at full compass. Therefore the prayer of the wise man will not be, give me understanding that I may know more and more, but give me understanding that I may live. Man is never just an observer: he is also an actor, responsible to man and God for his actions and inaction. Knowledge, rightly used, increases the goodness and worth of life, but the history of mankind does not allow us to assume that the mere knowing will insure true living.

This do and thou shalt live. Here we have another, but not an alternative, response to reality and the demands of life, different but not differing, complementary not conflicting.

Christianity moves among those imponderables which the laboratory cannot measure and technicians cannot manipulate, but which we know from experience to be the very stuff of life—love and hatred, pride and humility, hope and despair, joy and suffering, beauty and ugliness, truth and the lie, the whole content of human intercourse and endeavour, both the tragedy and the comedy of life. As proclaimed and exemplified by our Lord Jesus Christ it was a call "to choose, leap and be free"[1]—free to act courageously in the light of the true priorities in God's world. It is realistic about man's egoism, but not despairing. It recognizes the need of even the most honest thinker to pray that the Spirit of truth may cleanse the thoughts of his heart; the need of the most couageous and saintly to be able to say, "I am sorry: have mercy: forgive"; and the need of the ablest as much as the humblest to know, "My sufficiency is of God".

Authentic Christianity is sharply distinguished, however, from the religions and pieties of escape which turn their back on life, fearing and thinking evil of what men perceive and enjoy through their senses. Its concern is not so much "to save souls" as "to make men

[1] The phrase is Kierkegaard's.

whole", and to create and sustain a community within the total human society which will be at once its salt, its light and its leaven. When compelled in an emergency to choose, it prefers mercy to piety—"this do and thou shalt live"—but normally when free to choose it prefers the fine quality of thought and feeling—worship of the living God—that is completed in acts of justice, pity, love and peace.

The conviction of the Christian community, based on the promises of the Gospel and the experience of many generations, is that through such corporate faith and worship men may receive the power to make wiser choices, to act more unselfishly, and more nearly to love as God loves—a life which is life indeed!

The unfortunate conflicts between interpreters of Christian faith and modern science have nearly always happened because one or other, or both, have embraced what Whitehead called "the doctrine of dogmatic finality".[1] But once either or both allow that "dogmatic finality of verbal expression is a mistaken notion"—at least when pressed to an extreme—they can and will more easily walk together —not just co-existing, which is not good enough, but co-operating.

About that co-operation I wish briefly to say three things, if I may be so bold as to try to look into the future.

1. The *fundamental* need of the Western, quasi-Christian, world is a new re-formation of thought and belief which will give men once again a coherent world-view, and will help them to become integrated personalities, living in peaceable communities. "It was"—I quote Dr Raven—"the precise combination of Hebrew religion and Greek science which gave to early Christianity its compelling power and won Europe for the faith."[2] That world-view served its day, and now is disappearing beyond recall. To-day what is wanted is an integration of the faith preserved by the Church with modern science. For the present intellectual confusion is not just an academic problem: it is a social disaster. I would only add that the increasing specialization of knowledge makes this task at once more urgent and more difficult.

2. Before this new re-formation can "exercise compelling power" it will have to fashion new symbols, new art-forms, new imagery and so enlarge the language of poetry and Liturgy. In the life of the Church and in its out-reach into the world, we are being handicapped because the old Biblical words and imagery, out of which its Liturgy has grown, are losing their potency in an age that is quickly gaining a new comprehension of the universe and of man. As yet we have nothing to take their place. Liturgy, the symbols and words of common worship, just because it is common and not private and peculiar, must always be slow to change. The process cannot be hurried. But I do not see a large renewal of public worship in industrial society—needful though it is for the health and wholeness of its life—until the new concepts and ways of looking at things are more

[1] A. N. Whitehead, *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 208 and 220.
[2] Charles Raven, *Science, Religion and the Future*, p. 124.

generally understood and have become part of the language of poetry and imagination out of which Liturgy grows.

3. The Church needs the scientist *in its midst*, not just for his good, but also to save it from the attitude of "looking backwards every day" into which ecclesiastics, and indeed all institutions, when left to themselves tend to slip.

There is one recurring note in the New Testament to which the scientific mind is likely to be more sympathetic than are those who would be content with an inelastic and rigid traditionalism. Nothing is more characteristic of the Gospels and of the New Testament than its faith in "a God who comes" and its trust in the continuing ministry of the Spirit who dwelt in the Lord Jesus, to lead those who love him to truer understanding and fuller life, and to give them courage to press on beyond old frontiers.

Curiously, the one basic belief of the Church which has not yet been well thought out and understood is the belief in the Holy Spirit. And yet the Holy Spirit is the creator of the Church and, as Dr Vidler has written, "is its life-giver, its reformer and tormentor, and at last its only resource".[1] F. D. Maurice, that great prophet and professor of our Church in the nineteenth century, declared years ago, "I cannot but think that the reformation in our day, which I expect is to be more deep and searching than that of the sixteenth century, will turn upon the Spirit's presence and life".[2] In the Providence of God that day has tarried, the doctrine of the Spirit has still to be thought out. May that not be because its full comprehension requires the new light and knowledge which science is bringing?

In conclusion, just this: a week or two ago in the Alps I read a pregnant little book by the President of the Royal College of Physicians which closed with this sentence, "Man, while looking on the world with the cold eye of scientific vision *still* needs to be carried forward by the vital forces of the older modes of knowledge".[3]

"Still"! In what sense? Not, I would say, meaning "just for a time", because one day science will close the gaps and render the older modes, including faith, obsolete and unwanted. No! Until the end of history man will have to walk by faith as well as by sight, for he is an actor in the universe as well as an observer. To act rightly he needs forgiveness as well as confidence, love as well as learning, the power of the Spirit in order to live in community as a child of the Invisible God, who in one blessed moment of light revealed himself in the living, dying and rising to life again of Jesus Christ, the Lord in and through whom we have much joy.

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[1] A. R. Vidler, *Christian Belief*, p. 73; cp. also Chapter IV on the Holy Spirit.
[2] *Life of F. D. Maurice*, i, 543.
[3] W. Russell Brain, *Mind, Perception and Science*.

Demythologizing and Catholic Modernism

THE most arresting feature of the contemporary theological scene remains Rudolf Bultmann's proposed *Entmythologisierung*, or "demythologizing", of the New Testament. Despite the many criticisms, whether of principle or of detail, which have been brought against it, there has been widespread recognition of the fact that its author, the pre-eminent New Testament scholar of the day, has recalled theology to its primary task of re-interpreting, and not merely of expounding, the message of the Gospel if that message is to appear not only relevant but even intelligible to modern man. He has, that is to say, resumed the work of an older generation, and in so doing has reminded us that some problems which were then keenly discussed and of which the solution was boldly (if too impetuously) attempted are yet with us, and that should we for our part fail to tackle them Christianity as a spiritual force in the modern world is likely to decline still further. That Bultmann's own program differs markedly from that of the liberals is by now of course well known. Whereas they sought the mere elimination of mythical elements from the New Testament he urges their re-interpretation. The former were so evidently anxious to present "essential" Christianity as at all points compatible with the progressivist ideals of the nineteenth century that the "scandal" of the Cross had simply to be evaded; whereas the latter, on the contrary, insists that this scandal is in truth the vital substance of the Christian evangel and is at all costs to be retained; and to this end all merely adventitious obstacles such as the mythical trappings in which the Kerygma is clothed must needs be removed. The challenge of the Gospel is moral and spiritual, and as pertinent and formidable to-day as when first uttered; but the world-view which in the New Testament it is made to presuppose is completely unacceptable to an age whose ways of thinking have been moulded by science. Further—and what is even more important—only by the re-interpretation of myth shall we be able to understand what the Kerygma properly is and what it demands of ourselves.

Bultmann's purpose, therefore, is in large measure (though not entirely) apologetic. He desires that Christianity, the profound significance of which the centuries cannot impair, should be rendered, not pleasing or convenient, but communicable, to the world of to-day. The Gospel presents, he sincerely believes, an issue which in all ages must be critical for the man who faces it; the more necessary, then, is it that the Christian thinker apply himself to remove all such hindrances as are not in themselves part of the real *krisis* of the evangelical message. The New Testament account of the saving act (*Heilsereignis*) of God in Christ must be freed from the mythological setting in which we there find it; it must be "demythologized". And the task of demythologizing, as Bultmann stresses, cannot be less than the enterprise of a generation.

How Bultmann has been led to this conviction is easily comprehensible. He is a scholar whose investigations into the historical

origins of Christianity have led him, *qua* scholar, to a radical scepticism. Those elements in the New Testament tradition which may with any degree of assurance be affirmed as *historisch*, or authentic, amount to very little—indeed, to no more, it would appear, than the fact of the Crucifixion under Pontius Pilate. But ought we, he thinks, even to expect faith to depend for its validity upon a doubtful historical reconstruction? The attempt to build belief upon the elusive figure of the "Jesus of History" was the manifest error of the liberals. For what if the "Jesus of History" prove, as Schweitzer pointed out, to be beyond the grasp of historical inquiry—has the Gospel then lost all meaning? The thinking Christian must thus address himself to the labour of re-interpreting the faith—of showing its veritable basis and abiding import. A matter—no less—of the soul's life or death, to suppose it to be at the mercy of such accidents of history as must always attend the documentation of a tradition is to misconceive its whole character and purpose. Faith rather is a quality appertaining to the intrinsic nature of man. It is a "possibility", as Bultmann says, for human existence as such. There is therefore nothing occult or mysterious about it.

Bultmann's argument seems to indicate that his conception of God is what used to be called *immanentist*, and the more closely his theological position is considered the greater appears the degree of resemblance between it and that of those former critics and opponents of both orthodoxy and liberalism, the Catholic Modernists. A comparison of the two is indeed of striking interest. The Modernists' repudiation by the Vatican was of course abrupt and complete; nevertheless, it may well be maintained that in their day they presented a clearer, more comprehensive, less paradoxical account of what Christianity is than does the Lutheran teacher in ours and that their work possesses a greater apologetic value.

The Modernists found themselves, as Christians and as thinkers, in much the same predicament as does Bultmann now. They too were aware of the difficulties of teaching the traditional Christian creed in an age whose outlook had been revolutionized by the immense growth in scientific knowledge. Moreover, for them the problem was intensified by the fact of their being Roman Catholics and hence committed to the most rigid of all forms of Christian dogmatism. Their aim, in Loisy's words, was "to adapt the Catholic religion to the intellectual, moral and social needs of the present time";[1] and their starting-point, as is Bultmann's, was the problem posed by the express historical claims of Christianity. They did not, as Pius X alleged, start with a philosophy. Philosophy was brought in to aid them in their attempt to grapple with the historical difficulty. In this also are they paralleled by Bultmann, who, like Loisy, is primarily a student of the New Testament, but whose philosophical interest has been stimulated by his conviction of the need for a new apologetic. In respect of the Biblical account of Christian origins the Modernists' criticism, in its extremer forms, was sceptical and nega-

[1] *Simples réflexions* (1908), p. 14.

tive. The question that pressed itself upon them was whether and how far a belief in Christianity (and especially, as in their case, loyalty to the great tradition of Roman Christianity) could be reconciled with radical views—made in Germany—concerning the authenticity of the Biblical records. It seemed to them, as it now seems to Bultmann, incredible that the experimentally proven truth of Christianity should be made to depend upon particular testimony the reliability of which, as touching the events related, could not in the nature of things be verified even were it not, in numerous points of detail, actually open to serious doubt. Christianity was, they fully understood, an historical religion, but the profounder meaning of its historicity lay not in the veracity of a specific tradition so much as in its abiding historical significance, demonstrated in its incomparable power of self-purgation and renewal. Bultmann now draws the same distinction: what really signifies in the Christian message is not what is *historisch* but what is *geschichtlich*, or "eschatological". It is this quality of *historicity* which the Gospel possesses, not our ability to reconstruct the course of events which gave birth to it, that is vital to faith. In any case it is one event only which, to Bultmann's mind, has "cosmic significance": namely, the Cross, of which the Resurrection (however we choose to consider it) is not so much the vindication as itself an integral part, for "he who was delivered up for our trespasses was raised also for our justification".[1]

So also the Modernists. They too were prepared, in principle at least, to surrender to a greater or less degree of historical scepticism and to fall back upon the ever-present reality of Christian experience as the true foundation of belief. For Bultmann the essence of faith lies in personal apprehension of the saving efficacy of the Cross. This belongs not to the past but to the here-and-now, the actual possibilities of life as it may be lived, whether in the first century or the twentieth.[2] In it, despite the mythological terms in which the Event of Calvary is clothed and the paucity of our knowledge of the Victim himself, Bultmann sees the decisive act of God in history, continuously proclaimed to us in the Scriptures and evangelical preaching. For the Modernists, on the other hand, the meaning of the Gospel is at once realized and preserved in the abiding corporate experience of the Catholic Church. Christianity is thus an "organic fact" to be authenticated by appeal not to the peculiar authority of any single phase of its historical evolution but to its indefectible power to mediate the divine life to believers in all ages. "It is," says Loisy, "the life and persistence of the Gospel which have made it a permanent principle of moral and religious education, and a spiritual society

[1] Rom. 4. 25. "The meaning of the cross is not disclosed from the life of Jesus as a figure of past history, a life which needs to be reproduced by historical research. On the contrary, Jesus is not proclaimed as merely crucified; he is also risen from the dead. The cross and the resurrection form an inseparable unity" (*Kerygma and Myth*, ed. H.-W. Bartsch, E.T., p. 38).

[2] Faith indeed "is not a mysterious supernatural quality, but the disposition of genuine humanity" (ibid., p. 26). With which compare Tyrrell's belief that "we do not need to prove religion to men, but to show them that they are religious" (*Christianity at the Cross-Roads*, 1910, p. 108).

where the principle is put in force. *Ni le principe ne tient sans la société, ni la société sans le principe.*"[1] He adds that Protestantism, as interpreted by a liberal such as Harnack, wishes to keep only the principle, whereas Catholicism stands for both principle and society. For Harnack's name substitute Bultmann's and we may see in *Entmythologisierung* a novel form of the old Lutheran doctrine of individual faith responding to the preachment of the Gospel. For Bultmann "faith" becomes an *existentiell* decision in response to a demythologized Kerygma. But both Bultmann and the Modernists would have agreed that the "proof" of the Gospel rests not in historical claims likely to satisfy the requirements of the technical historian but in its capacity to act as the medium of an actual experience. The one argues in Lutheran terms, the others in Catholic; and both alike are at odds with liberalism no less than with the conventional orthodoxy.[2] For, on the one hand, they deny that the Gospel can be equated with the Jesus of History, of whom historically we know very little, and maintain that the Risen Christ comes to us either, as Bultmann insists, in the individual faith created by the evangelic message, or, as Catholicism teaches, in the sacramental life of the Divine Society; whilst on the other hand they hold it to be a false aim to try to prove the authenticity of the Gospel from the Biblical testimony to supposedly miraculous facts.[3] Rejecting at once both the liberal "humanitarian" Christianity and the literalism of orthodox teaching, Bultmann to-day, like the Modernists fifty years since, fights his battle on two fronts—against a rationalism from which he seeks to preserve the inherent *skandalon* of the Kerygma (or as the latter would have said, "the supernatural mystery" of Christianity), and against the traditionalism which clings to modes of thought inconsistent with the knowledge and outlook of modern man.

Moreover, for the re-presentation of Christian truth which they envisage Bultmann and his predecessors alike turn to a specific philosophy. This, in the former's case, is the current existentialism, and more particularly the *Existenzphilosophie* of Martin Heidegger, of which certain key-conceptions—*Dasein, Vorhandensein, Verfallen-*

[1] *L'Evangile et l'Eglise*, 5e éd., 1930, p. 165.

[2] In his article "Zum Problem des Entmythologisierung", in the second volume of *Kerygma und Mythos* (Hamburg, 1952), Bultmann claims explicitly that his conception of faith is exactly in line with that of St Paul and Luther. Luther himself, he argues, regarded faith as a "new understanding of existence" (*Existenz-Verständnis*), and cites the former's own words: "et ita Deus per suum exire nos facit ad nos ipsos introire et per sui cognitionem infert nobis et nostri cognitionem"; as also Melanchthon's "Christum cognoscere hoc est: beneficia eius cognoscere, non eius naturas et modos incarnationis intueri" (p. 200). Demythologizing, Bultmann tells us, destroys, precisely as does the doctrine of justification, "all false assurance and all false desire of assurance", based whether on good works or exact knowledge. But he would probably dissent from Modernism as much on philosophical grounds as religious. For is not the Church, as Catholicism understands it, a collectivity, and thus (in Heideggerian terms) a form of *das Man*, repressive of the *ich*?

[3] Cf. Schleiermacher's aphorism: "Ihr könnt ihm (God) nicht glauben willkürlich, sondern weil ihr müsst."

heit, etc.—are adapted to the demands of a Christian context. The relevance of certain existentialist ideas to Christian experience is of course apparent, and avowedly Christian existentialists like Marcel (who himself is a Catholic) have made their mark in contemporary European thought. Although Heidegger's metaphysic is worked out in explicitly non-theistic terms Bultmann has allowed himself to be so strongly influenced by it that he has been censured for having in fact substituted philosophy for theology. It is of no little interest, therefore, to recall that not only were the Modernists also markedly influenced by philosophical considerations, but that the philosophy they favoured was of a type *akin* to existentialism and in some respects a distinct anticipation of it. Indeed, the Papal encyclical in which Modernism was condemned[1] went so far as to find in the latter's dominant metaphysical presuppositions the clue to the explanation of the whole Modernist position. This may have been, as Loisy and others objected that it was, untrue; and certainly the Vatican document—able though it is—is not to be taken as a fair and informed account of Modernist doctrine. But the philosophical tendency of Modernism was too pronounced to be discounted. These thinkers turned away from scholasticism, which, as then usually taught, only disgusted them, to the "activism" or personalism that had already established something of a tradition in French philosophy, and to the fashionable trans-Atlantic pragmatism of C. S. Peirce.[2] All were opposed to what they described as "intellectualism". *Pascaliens*, they looked for the springs of faith rather in those "reasons of the heart" that reason knows not of than in formal statements of "revealed" truths. Scholasticism, so (for example) Laberthonnière held, conceived the Object of faith not as a living Reality but as a scheme of ideas the supernatural meaning of which must lie beyond the believer's comprehension. But truth is not such as to require mere submission. Every attempt at an apologetic, therefore, "apparaît comme une démarche de l'esprit humain pour affirmer envers et contre tout, pourrait-on-dire, son autonomie et pour se devoir à lui-même la vérité qu'il admet".[3] If a dogma is a mere "formula without content" by what can the obligation to believe be constituted? A dogma of faith, however, is rather—to use Le Roy's phrase—*une prescription d'ordre pratique, une règle de conduite pratique*.[4] The supernatural is intelligible only in so far as it becomes immanent in human experience. It is therefore essentially personal. "We have always a personal responsibility for what we believe, and the feeling of that responsibility is inalienable."[5] Philosophy and theology must alike "safeguard that autonomy which constitutes our moral personality" by proclaiming a truth "whose character it is to be immanent", to be found within us, in what we are and what we ought to be. From this point it is but a step to Bultmann's conception

[1] *Pascendi dominici gregis* (1908).
[2] See L. S. Stebbing, *Pragmatism and French Voluntarism* (Cambridge, 1914).
[3] L. Laberthonnière, *Essais de Philosophie religieuse* (1902), p. xvii.
[4] *Dogme et critique* (1907), p. 25.
[5] Laberthonnière, op. cit., p. xvii.

of faith as "the natural disposition of man"—his *authentic* disposition, that is, achieved by *Selbstverständnis*, self-understanding.[1]

I am not here concerned with criticism either of *Entmythologisierung* or of Modernism. But it is to be observed that what in general may be said of the one may, *mutatis mutandis*, be said of the other. Both are in the nature of expedients devised by Christian intellectuals when faced with the problem of personal belief. How far either would prove effective in *gaining* adherents to Christianity is very difficult to assess. Both are embarrassed by a simple appeal to historic "facts" and envisage a theology which more or less overtly surrenders the historic claim. Bultmann, by a radical delimitation of the content of Christian preaching finds in the truth (as he believes it to be) of the Gospel's "historicity" the reason and justification of the act of faith. The Modernists point, not to the disputable events in an irrecoverable past, but to the perdurable fact of Catholicism, its life and its witness. For both, the vindication of Christianity, the grounds on which it is to be commended to and accepted by the modern world, are in the indefectible testimony of present experience. Inevitably therefore do they diverge from the path of orthodox doctrine. Dogma is a religious symbolism, and its use is pragmatic. Thus Christ's pre-existence and the legend of the Virgin Birth are clearly attempts, according to Bultmann, "to explain the meaning of the Person of Jesus for faith". We can see meaning in them, as in the recorded events of his life, "only when we ask what God is trying to say to each one of us through them".[2] For Tyrrell they are "prophetic truths", not "fact-truths".[3] For Le Roy the teaching that "Jesus is risen" is really an exhortation: Let your attitude to him be what it would have been before his death; you are to regard him as a contemporary.[4] If the Modernist apologetic should, by comparison, seem to be the more comprehensive of the two it is because the experience to which appeal is made is not merely individual but corporate and has therefore an "objectivity" which the former notably lacks.

[1] Closely parallel, it seems to me, with Bultmann's doctrine of *Selbstverständnis* is Laberthonnière's *l'affirmation de soi* (see the essay "Le dogmatisme moral" in *Essais de Philosophie religieuse*, pp. 19–110, and particularly section iv). For Bultmann self-understanding is not merely theoretical, but practical or existential. He quotes St Paul: "Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind" (cf. *Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, pp. 207 ff.). "He can say that Jesus taught men a new understanding of themselves; that Saint Paul's conversion was a new self-understanding; that the Christian life is a new understanding of the self. . . . It is equivalent to a new life" (J. Macquarrie, *An Existentialist Theology*, 1955, pp. 65 f.). So too for the French Oratorian. Revelation, in the light of which we comprehend what we are and what we are to become, must be "lived morally". "La vérité ne devient nôtre que dans la mesure où nous-mêmes, avec tout ce que nous sommes, travaillons à la faire en nous." Truth in religion must be understood essentially "en fonction de la vie". Otherwise "on confirme dans leur préjugés les philosophes qui reprochent à la religion d'encombrer l'esprit humain avec des dogmes étrangers à la vie" (*Essais*, pp. xxv, xxviii).

[2] *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 35.

[3] See *Through Scylla and Charybdis* (1907), ch. ix.

[4] *Dogme et critique*, p. 26.

But the controversy aroused by Bultmann's challenge serves to show that the complacent assumptions of much modern Biblicism and neo-fundamentalism are unfounded and that the issues which faced Christian thinkers a generation or so ago were then, and are to-day, relevant and significant, and that for the most part they remain unsolved.[1] It reminds us that if Christianity is to be rendered intelligible to educated men in an age of science the traditional forms of doctrine, inherited from a remote past, must be re-interpreted. In particular it obliges us to ask—as in its day did Modernism—upon what assurance can faith be built when the historical basis once unquestioningly accepted may be said to involve even an element of serious doubt.

B. M. G. Reardon.

A New Kind of Demythologizing?

When anyone who is interested in contemporary theology reads Professor Braithwaite's Eddington Memorial Lecture,[2] the question which is likely to occur to him is whether we are being offered in this lecture a new kind of demythologizing. Up till now we have been accustomed to associate this term with the efforts of Professor Bultmann to translate statements which purport to speak of some transcendent reality into statements about human existence. But Professor Braithwaite appears to be doing something very similar. Thus

[1] The interest of Roman Catholic scholars in *Entmythologisierung* is pronounced, and two of the best comprehensive studies of the whole current discussion are the work of Jesuits: Père Malevez, whose *Message chrétien et le Mythe* (Desclée de Brouwer, 1954) has already been reviewed in Theology (March 1955, pp. 107 ff.), and now, even more fully, by Père René Marlé in *Bultmann et l'interprétation du Nouveau Testament* (Aubier, 1956) (see also *Recherches de Science religieuse*, 1953, pp. 612–32). Both writers approach their subject with a keenness of interest and a degree of sympathy and patience which would have been unthinkable in the days of the *crise moderniste* fifty years ago. Marlé's book is a magisterial survey of the entire field, dealing in turn with Bultmann's place in contemporary Protestant theology, the idea of myth as a category of New Testament exegesis, the application to it of an existentialist mode of interpretation, the disputed question of the relation of philosophy to faith, and finally the problem of the historicity of Jesus. Naturally he is critical—"Bultmann fait subir au message chrétien un appauvrissement indéniable"—but nowhere does one detect the tones of outraged orthodoxy. He believes that Catholicism may well learn from the Lutheran teacher that the task of theology as an understanding of divine Revelation is by no means concluded. If the scriptural tradition is to be rendered intelligible to our contemporaries no resource whether of science or philosophy can be neglected which may be of aid in making it so. Above all must the Catholic Christian be no less mindful than the Protestant of "the tragic difficulty for the mind of to-day, caught up in the movement of a century from which nevertheless it cannot free itself, to remain, even though it sincerely desires to do so, faithful to Jesus Christ". Marlé would not say—with Bultmann—that *the* problem of the Church in our time is a theological one. But he would agree that an attempt to solve the theological problem is essential.

[2] *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief*, Cambridge University Press, 3s. 6d.

he tells us that the statement, "God is love", which he very reasonably takes to epitomize the assertions of the Christian religion, is to be interpreted as the declaration of an intention to follow what he calls an agapeistic way of life (p. 18). Here a statement which most people would ingenuously assume to be about God is translated into the assertion of a human intention. This may lead us to suppose that Professor Bultmann and Professor Braithwaite are both engaged in what is fundamentally the same endeavour, and that the difference between them arises from their different philosophical presuppositions. The former speaks as an existentialist, the latter as an empiricist, but they are at one in trying to formulate religious statements in terms of human existence or human experience.

A straightforward comparison between the two points of view would be extremely difficult. Thus, for instance, Professor Bultmann's somewhat ill-defined category of myth cuts across Professor Braithwaite's distinction between religious statements and religious stories. Religious statements appear to say something about God, but, we are told, are used to announce "allegiance to a set of moral principles", and therein lies their meaning. On the other hand, religious stories are sets of empirical propositions, which are given a meaning like any other empirical propositions. Here a further distinction arises. Some of these empirical propositions will be simple historical statements, such as that Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate, and these may be readily believed to be true. But others, such as that Christ ascended into heaven, seem to be in a different category. Such a statement Professor Bultmann would call a myth. Both he and Professor Braithwaite seem to be agreed that from the religious point of view, it is a matter of indifference whether the stories are believed to be literally true or not. Obviously a man could believe that Christ suffered under Pontius Pilate, and not be a Christian. A man might even believe that Christ ascended into heaven, and be a Muslim. Both our demythologizers are right in maintaining that a crude literalism is irrelevant to religion. But when we ask what the function of these stories is, we receive different answers. Professor Bultmann tells us that they are to be interpreted in terms of their significance for human existence. Professor Braithwaite's view is that they are to be entertained in association with the intention to follow an agapeistic way of life, and that when so entertained they can have a powerful psychological effect in helping people to carry out their intended policy. Whether these two points of view are as different as they seem at first sight, it would be hard to say. Clearly, it could not be just any set of stories that would have the effect of which Professor Braithwaite speaks, but a set which caused the person entertaining them to understand himself as committed to a certain way of life, and here we seem to come fairly near to Professor Bultmann's idea that the myth does not give information about an objective fact but brings about a new self-understanding.

This preliminary comparison leads to another on a more fundamental level. Both thinkers appear to have similar ideas about the

essential element in religion. They are equally emphatic in the rejection of the idea that religion is primarily acceptance of a world-view. They also agree in denying that religion is primarily emotion, though there is an emotional factor in it. For Professor Braithwaite, religion is primarily conative in character, and he can speak of "an ultimate decision to accept a way of life" (p. 34). For Professor Bultmann, the primary element in faith is also decision or commitment. In both cases there is an attempt to get away from the transcendent element in religion and to speak in human terms of a way of life, whether the language be that of self-understanding or the assertion of an intention.

We may have grave doubts as to whether religion can be thus humanized without its ceasing to be religion. It may well be that commitment to a way of life implicitly commits us at the same time to a metaphysical belief of some kind. As far as Professor Bultmann is concerned, it is not hard to show that in spite of his acceptance of a thorough-going program of demythologizing which is to interpret all religious statements and myths in terms of self-understanding, there remain in his thinking apparently irreducible transcendent elements which may be inconsistent with his theories but may at the same time be true to the nature of the Christian religion. We propose now to examine Professor Braithwaite's position to see whether there may not also be implicit in it what we may call a transcendent element, in spite of the fact that such an element is excluded by his theory.

In 1935 Professor Ayer was contending that ethics, theology, and metaphysics were alike nonsensical. This contention was made chiefly on the ground that in these subjects we can have no empirical verification of what they seem to assert, and therefore there can be no meaning in their assertions. But as Professor Paton has neatly put it, "as originally expounded, logical positivism sweeps away so much into one comprehensive rubbish heap that it is difficult not to feel there must be something wrong with it".[1] Consequently there has been a gradual withdrawal from the more extreme point of view. First there were attempts to rehabilitate ethics. Now the salvage operations are being extended to religion. But so far as I am aware, no attempt has yet been made to raise the wreck of metaphysics from the still deeper water in which it went down under heavy fire.

The empiricist who seeks to rehabilitate religion must therefore attempt to do so without metaphysics. As we have already noted, Professor Braithwaite makes a valiant effort in this direction. For the older verification principle, there is substituted the wider principle of use. A statement gets its meaning from the way in which we use it. Thus religious statements cease to be nonsensical, though admittedly the meaning now attributed to them is not an obvious one. Who would have thought, for instance, that when the Christian says that God is love, he is really evincing or showing forth an intention to follow an agapeistic way of life?

[1] *The Modern Predicament*, p. 114.

Professor Braithwaite's conative interpretation of the religious statement comes very close to reducing religion to morality. But there are still the stories which provide the psychological support for the intention to act in a certain way, and it is the entertaining of these stories that distinguishes religion from simple morality. Presumably these stories, among other things, engender certain feelings, so that we could think of religion in Arnold's famous phrase as "morality touched with emotion", though this is not quite adequate to Professor Braithwaite's view. He does not wish to make too much of emotion in religion, but he admits that it has its place. He speaks, for instance, of "feelings of joy, of consolation, of being at one with the universe" (p. 15). I sought to maintain in a previous article[1] that religious feelings are never mere emotions, but always carry with them some kind of understanding, even if it is not explicit. Thus it seems to me that I could scarcely feel "at one with the universe" unless I understood that the universe were the kind of thing with which I could be at one—if, for instance, it were the creation of a God of love. In admitting such feelings into religion, Professor Braithwaite appears to be acknowledging that the stories which engender such feelings are not merely edifying parables to be entertained in the mind as psychological aids to good living, but that they throw light on the ultimate questions of existence—the metaphysical questions, if we care to call them such. It is hard to see how there could be either joy or consolation if we had no clue to the problem of what kind of a universe this is, or if we maintained that that is a question which cannot properly be asked.

But since Professor Braithwaite does not lay stress on the affective element in religion, we cannot attach too much importance to these considerations, even if they provide a pointer. He could drop his feeling of being at one without serious damage to his main thesis, though it would certainly mean an impoverishment of his conception of religion. But there is another line of thought to be considered. Religion may be primarily commitment to a way of life, but such commitment involves us in some kind of belief. We must ask how this belief is related to the act of commitment, and what kind of belief it is.

How is the belief related to the act of resolving to follow a way of life? Professor Braithwaite says that "to say that it is belief in the dogmas of religion which is the cause of the believer's intending to behave as he does is to put the cart before the horse" (p 16). I believe that he is perfectly correct in this assertion. Like the devils mentioned by St James, I could believe Christian doctrines to be true without being committed to a Christian way of life. I might be a theist as far as philosophical theory is concerned, and yet be without any conviction that could properly be called religious. Professor Bultmann would also be in agreement here. Religious beliefs are not theoretical but practical, and it is only in living them out that we really begin to understand them. But there is another side to the

[1] In THEOLOGY, May 1955.

question. The initial act of commitment is surely not just a blind leap in the dark. A decision, to be worthy of the name, must be taken in the light of our beliefs, and it is to be hoped that these will be reasonable beliefs which we consider ourselves to have grounds for accepting. This is recognized by Professor Braithwaite, who quotes with approval a sentence from R. M. Hare to the effect that an ultimate decision to accept a way of life "far from being arbitrary . . . would be the most well-founded of decisions, because it would be based upon a consideration of everything upon which it could possibly be founded" (p. 34). It may be that, to begin with, the belief is not explicitly formulated and that it is only *ambulando* that we come to understand all that is involved in it. But the point is that a belief of some kind is present from the beginning as an essential element in the committing of oneself to a way of life. There is a sense in which we act upon our beliefs, and as rational agents we should be able to explain why we are following the policies which we have chosen.

We now have to ask our second and more important question. What is the nature of the belief which accompanies the commitment to a way of life? Let us approach the question in this way. Using Professor Braithwaite's terminology, we are entitled to ask the Christian, "Why do you intend to follow an agapeistic way of life?" If his decision to follow such a way of life was not just an arbitrary one, he can answer the question, and he may well think that the most satisfactory answer is simply: "I intend to follow an agapeistic way of life because God is love." But if Professor Braithwaite's interpretation of the statement "God is love" is correct, the answer amounts to saying: "I intend to follow an agapeistic way of life because I declare (evince, or show forth) my intention of following it." This hardly looks like the answer of a rational moral agent, and it is quite certainly not what the Christian means. Surely what he means is to affirm his faith that love is the ultimate power in the universe. And he may even go on to say, following St Augustine, that it was his experience of the love of God revealed in Christ which evoked or elicited love in himself and empowered him to follow an agapeistic way of life.

This belief that love is at the heart of the universe is presumably a metaphysical one. But it is not, as was said before, a detached speculation, from which we would have to make the transition somehow to an agapeistic way of life. It is a practical belief, involved in the decision taken when a man chooses an agapeistic way of life in preference to any other. It seems quite implausible to suggest about such a man that there is "nothing which he takes to be the fundamental truth about the universe" (p. 33). On the contrary, the way of life which Professor Braithwaite describes implies just such a belief. Much more plausible is the old saying that every man has a metaphysic at the back of his mind—sometimes pretty far back. He must act *as if* the universe were of some kind or another. The Christian acts (or intends to act) *as if* love were the most real and important thing of all. His understanding of what love is will become

clearer and purer through following in the way of love. But love cannot cease to be a personal quality, so that to act *as if* love were the fundamental truth about the universe is to believe in a God who is *at least* personal—perhaps more, but the Christian does not speculate about God as he may be in himself.

That religious beliefs carry metaphysical implications may be seen also in what Professor Braithwaite says about religions other than Christianity. He argues that Judaism and Buddhism also recommend an agapeistic way of life, and that the three religions are distinguished only by the different sets of stories associated with the moral intention in each case. One might question the somewhat free use of such a distinctively New Testament term as "agapeistic" here, but it could certainly be agreed that it is in their ethical teaching that the great religions come nearest to one another. For instance, in a well-known *sutta* the Buddha bids his disciples entertain goodwill even towards bandits who may be sawing off their limbs, and this invites comparison with the Christian injunction to love one's enemies. But we may ask the Buddhist the same question that we asked the Christian: "Why do you intend to follow a policy of goodwill towards the bandits?" His reply, it seems fair to say, would be to the effect that to entertain a passion of ill-will would be a hindrance to salvation. This answer, however, implies the whole Buddhist understanding of man as entangled in the wheel of becoming—a pessimistic view of life, according to which existence is painful. Thus the difference between Christianity and Buddhism is more than just the difference between two sets of stories. The sets of stories which, as Professor Braithwaite insists, are to be taken as a whole, point in each case to the fundamental difference—the implicit understanding of the universe and of man's place in it. In the case of Buddhism it is a pessimistic understanding, in the case of Christianity it is the understanding that the ultimate reality is love, and perhaps it is only in the latter case that the term "agapeistic" may properly be used. It is only fair to add that some forms of Mahayana Buddhism approximate much more closely to the Christian point of view, and teach that love or compassion is the ultimate nature of things. But in any case, the point is that the sets of stories carry with them what we may call a transcendent reference. They point to an understanding of man's existence in a metaphysical or ontological setting.

It is to be hoped that some time Professor Braithwaite will give us a fuller account of his views than is possible in the space of a single lecture.[1] I began by asking whether he is offering us a new kind of demythologizing, and I think that we may now say that he is. Except that they are working in different philosophical traditions, Professor

[1] When the present article was composed, the writer had not seen the recent discussions of Professor Braithwaite's lecture in *The Cambridge Review*, Nos. 1877–80. There the reader will find a series of articles by J. N. Schofield, D. M. MacKinnon, and I. T. Ramsey, together with a reply by Professor Braithwaite, in all of which further aspects of the problems raised by the original lecture are treated.

Bultmann and Professor Braithwaite appear to be moving in the same direction. Both have a profound distrust of "world-views", both are acutely aware of the intellectual climate of the times, yet both remain convinced of the value of Christianity. They are doing a great service to religion in insisting that it does not begin with accepting a doctrine or a philosophy, but with an act of decision and commitment. Yet there are limits to their respective theses, and in their desire to make Christianity intellectually "respectable" they are inclined to overstep them. The Christian religion is not adequately expressed either as a new self-understanding or as a moral belief associated with a set of stories. In Martin Buber's language, we have to consider not only man's way to God, but also God's way to man. And while the latter may be a mystery of which we can speak only in "parables and dark sayings", it is at the heart of the Christian Gospel.

JOHN MACQUARRIE.

The Sane Society and the Kingdom of God

PEOPLE who always feel better after taking their weekly dose of *The New Statesman* will enjoy reading Eric Fromm's latest book.[1] In it there is no reference to sin. What is wrong with the world is that it is alienated. You and I and "most of our psychologists" are alienated. Civilization, culture, society, our work, our thinking, our art, all, all are alienated. Finally, incredible though it may seem, "God is as alienated as the world as a whole".

Something in Fromm's unconscious makes him preach at alienated man with all the nagging persistence of the old Scottish minister who knew that his congregation liked nothing so much as to be overwhelmed by the evidence of its own and, in greater degree, other people's sinfulness. This psychologist preacher certainly gives his readers the impression that they are not quite as alienated as other people are; nevertheless, their case is indeed desperate until, just as they are beginning to lose all hope, up pops a version of social democracy complete with all the virtues. After contemplating this, we are all supposed to settle down and "apply the concept of alienation more empirically to various observable phenomena" and wait patiently for the New World Religion which "will come into existence with the appearance of a new great teacher"—the usual sequence of Uncle Tom Quetzalcoatl and all entitle us to expect him. For people who like this sort of thing, here is a book to be enjoyed.

It is, of course, more than likely that THEOLOGY also has amongst its fans readers who have got into the habit of enjoying books primarily because they confirm them in their own ways. To all such I would commend *The Sane Society*, not because they will enjoy it—they won't—but because they need a penance, and this book properly

[1] *The Sane Society*. International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction. Routledge and Kegan Paul. 25s.

used as a discipline is capable of producing rich results. The correct procedure in this case should be: read every single page most carefully; at the end of each section pause to consider whether you agree with the thought or no; if you do agree, pause again and consider whether the matter of which you approve was selected by the author for "the right reasons"; if you do not agree, try to make a more satisfactory statement of your own, great care being taken to see that you really are dealing with the particular point which the author is trying to make and not merely with matter of your own choosing. Most of us, I fear, would emerge from such a test with more profit than distinction, for though in many ways the book is a muddled book, it is muddled about the things which, whether we realize it or no, we ourselves are in a muddle about. Certainly we must not flatter ourselves that it is the Grace of God which has prevented us from writing such a book—our own unwillingness to search diligently enough for signs of the Divine Logos in our Twentieth Century New Learning has prevented us from even attempting to serve our faith as Fromm has attempted to serve his humanism. For theologians and Christian sociologists in search of a penance, here is a book to be endured.

But there is still a third reason why this book may be recommended. That every scientific discipline has its own special quota to add to our knowledge of God's eternal purpose is, for the Christian, the ultimate justification for science itself. Every thoughtful Christian therefore should be interested in any work which like *The Sane Society* purports to make sense out of the tangled mass of survey and research with which our age has surrounded itself. Fromm has behind him university courses in psychology and sociology and a training in psychoanalysis at the Psychological Institute of Berlin. Moreover, he has already won a large audience, for his earlier book *The Fear of Freedom*[1] is now in its seventh impression. Here, then, is an opportunity for the Christian to acquaint himself with some of the new contacts with reality which our scientists are making. Was not the medieval theologian able to dominate his age only because he was steeped in all its sciences and used its findings to give point to his teaching?

Eric Fromm, like so many other scientists, does not appear to have been much influenced by our physicists, nor, unfortunately, has he taken into account the researches of Henri Bremond, Collingwood, Malraux and others concerning the artists' creative activity. Moreover, his philosophical preparation for the work he has undertaken seems inadequate. Nevertheless, within his limits, and they are by no means narrow, he has certainly done a very worthwhile job. Other psychologists may perhaps criticize his conception of a Humanistic Psychoanalysis, though to a layman there is something very refreshing about the way he uses his psychological technique upon our "unadjusted" culture. And if he leads us, as he appears to do, to the conclusion that religious teachers and psychologists alike are to-day

[1] Reviewed in THEOLOGY, January 1943, pp. 21 f.

assisting in the robotization of man, the sooner we all sit up and do something about it the better. In the meantime nothing but good can come from being reminded that the desire to live comfortably with our defects has a formative influence upon the cultures we create.

As he diagnoses our condition and examines various remedies which are being proferred for its amendment, Fromm uses much material which could well be employed to bring new life to many an old sermon. And very often in this way the author's own thought could be carried even further than it has been in the book. For example, though his allegiance to Marx and Freud, his two main influences, does not prevent him from saying (about man's development) that "the biblical Paradise myth expresses the situation with perfect clarity", he gleans nothing whatever from either of them, or from a host of other witnesses ranging from Durkheim and Proudhon to Cole and Tawney, to enable him to see that the Christian vision of the Kingdom of God also has its validity. When dealing with human origins he is impelled to write "he (man) has fallen out of nature, as it were, and is still in it; he is partly divine, partly animal; partly infinite, partly finite". These statements may contain the implication of a separation between matter and spirit which neither our belief in the Sacraments nor post-Newtonian physics would support. Nevertheless, they point in the right direction. But Fromm does not follow them up, and there is no reference either to the divine or to the infinite when he writes about the "Humanistic Communitarian Socialism" which he regards as our goal. Perhaps this is because a scientific technique cannot be used as effectively upon the future as it can upon the past; perhaps also, as his references to "collective art" and his neglect of aesthetics imply, it is because he thinks ethics are an effective substitute for the human imagination. But at any rate he is consistent, witness his unsupported statements—"Religious rituals have little significance any more, except for Catholics" and "theistic concepts are bound to disappear in the future development of mankind".

Need we argue about such assertions? My own opinion is that were there an Institute of Christian Sociology in existence Fromm should be placed somewhere at the top of the list of distinguished workers to be invited to spend a term in residence. A man who can say "as long as my gain is limited by the effort I make, my desire is limited" has already made a contribution to Christian sociology. One may be permitted to doubt, however, whether the author realizes that his aphorism throws light upon man's insatiable desire for God as well as providing, on the economic plane, a valuable point of departure for an inquiry into the probable social effects of Automation. Thank God, the Christian doctrine of Grace holds out the hope and possibility of unexpected gains being "added unto" and modifying those which man's own efforts, by themselves, entitle him to expect from his technological discoveries. We can still believe in "Laborare est orare".

T. M. Heron.

Studies in Texts

Luke 21. 28: *Now when these things begin to take place, look up and raise your heads, because your redemption is drawing near.*

This passage, if we take it at all seriously, puts right out of court two basic sorts of propaganda that often find their way into our notions of what we as Christians have to look forward to. They are readily stated in their extreme form. First, that God is an absentee Creator who finally delivers men from this vale of tears and rewards them with a sort of perpetual holiday. Second, that man, when all is said and done (by man and by God himself), is self-sufficient and his deliverance rests in his own ability to withstand the things that beset him—to brush them aside as unworthy of his tears. These things are easy to say. It is easy to talk about a God tucked away in heaven—he may once have shown his face on earth, but that was long ago and now he is safely back above the clouds. It is easy to talk about men with whom God does not interfere—he may once have shown them the way to live, but that was long ago and now he has left them to get on with the job. These things are too easily and comfortably said to measure up to "the foolishness of preaching". However we modify, combine or disguise them, we shall never be able to set them in place within the gospel of "Jesus Christ and him crucified".

We are not taught here to keep our head erect, to keep a stiff upper lip whatever is going on about us or within us, as the Stoics preached; nor "to await and endure the smiles or frowns of fate with an equal mind", as Spinoza taught. Neither are we told to bow our heads before the judgment of an angry God who makes unnecessary noises and causes unnecessary suffering to his creatures: to fix our minds on the promise of eternal bliss and withdraw ourselves from the defiling world when possible and, when it is not, to accept our bodily destruction. We are told to *look up*, to "raise our heads", for it is not our destruction which is upon us (after which nothing—simply a happy release into non-existence or escape into a life of bliss safely in heaven). It is our deliverance by the Son of Man, "coming in a cloud with power and great glory".

We cannot get away from it by saying that the language is poetical and metaphorical. The important thing about the language is that it is forceful and immediate and is about the power of God applied in its fulness to the weakness of humanity and to the whole of the universe of his creation. It is a deliverance of our human life as it is, bound up closely with the material things of our environment—a deliverance that comes about when God claims his own: ourselves and the world about us. All is his and must attend the day of his coming. What distinguishes the Christian in a time of troubles like the present is not that he believes he has had or will have a better deal than the next man; he knows that his deliverance comes from the sufferings of him to whom was dealt the rawest deal ever, who took it to himself, and whose sufferings are not in vain for those who endure to the end, in active love.

In this passage from St Luke's Gospel, we have something which teaches us how to understand the psalmist's "I will trust and not be afraid". It is not simply that through all troubles (all sorts of troubles, including the unimaginable horrors that are in people's minds just now, in the "light of the Atom")—it is not simply that through them the Christian learns not to fear. The Stoic, ancient and present-day, learns not to fear, for fear is useless—a waste of time. The otherworldly mystic learns not to fear, for fear is unworthy of his own spiritual life. The Christian does not fear, because he is working together with One who is in it with him, and the very troubles themselves are the sign of his approaching deliverance. Our heads are to be raised in joy, not to be bowed even in simple trust or held erect as becomes the soldiers of a great King. We are not to rise above our dangers, under our own steam as it were; nor are we to continue in dutiful, ignorant obedience, simply trusting in our great commander. We are sons, entering into an inheritance bought with a price.

And God, too, is waiting for the end, actively and purposively. Were it not so, we could never lift our heads. But our trust is in such a God; and in those times of hopelessness in which we all find ourselves when we feel that whatever we should do "when these things begin to happen" it would *not* be to raise our heads, then it is such a God that comes to our aid, delivers us from the sin of fear, and transforms our trust into an active co-operation with himself. The waiting for the end that we have to do is a very active business. The picture drawn in this passage is not of someone who prepares himself by withdrawing from the world, but one who is active about God's business in his world while it groans and travails. The picture is of a man who is, in the eyes of that world, a worthy object of persecution: worthy to be betrayed by his parents and brethren and kinsfolk and friends—and worthy to be hated of all men for his Name's sake. That is not the picture of a passive sufferer, but of a suffering servant, active and suffering together with the Son of Man whose coming in glory is his deliverance. Our sufferings have no significance apart from those of Jesus. It is in his sufferings that we are healed; but in order to enter into our heritage we must be bruised.

But what has become of the "heritage" after all this—the glorious heritage which is to come down to us? What has become of "the promised time when war shall be no more"? If this is not to be the culmination of an evolutionary process, is it then the realization of a species of revolutionary dream? If Jesus did not die to show forth a fleeting world and an incorporeal eternity, was he another Prometheus—the very type of all revolutionaries—who stole the secrets of power from the hands of the divine tyrant in order to build his own heaven upon earth? No, Jesus was no Prometheus, but the second Adam, who took the "double agony" to himself. In the travail of his Mother he came; and that travail, together with the helpless pain that Joseph suffered, standing by, he took to himself in his Cross.

His resurrection and ascension were not stages in his retiral from earth to heaven; the God who was in Christ did not reward himself with a celestial superannuation. His Name is the Name of a Lamb as it had been slain. And he continues with us, who are his Body in the power of his Spirit. In so far as we are his members we must claim to be partakers of his sufferings. If we refuse to suffer with him, we are none of his, and must suffer without him—which is Hell. If we seek suffering, again we are none of his, and again must suffer without him. We must not seek to suffer. Suffering is evil; that is why it cost God so much. We must seek only to do what he asks us to do; which means that there is no limit to what we must be *prepared* to suffer *with him*. That is the form of our preparation. It means that we must walk humbly with the God whose face we see in Jesus Christ and rejoice that it is his kingdom that is coming and no worldly or otherworldly Utopia. Humbly and joyfully, as the Mother of our Lord welcomed him at his first coming. She knew that "it is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God"; but she obeyed his Word to her and did not fear. She said, "Behold the handmaid of the Lord . . ." And rejoiced and said, "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour". ¶ "And when the days were accomplished that she should be delivered . . . she brought forth her first-born son." The Son, whom Mary bore in suffering, was her Lord and Saviour, by whose stripes she was healed. And he it is that shall come again, in the groaning and travailing of his world, to finish his new creation.

JAMES A. GARDINER.

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CORRESPONDENCE

"THEOLOGICAL VERBOSITY"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

The truth appears to be even worse than I had imagined. From Mr Cordes' letter there are to be, it seems, at least eleven part-volumes of Dr Barth's *Church Dogmatics*. Furthermore, my estimate that it could be read at the rate of fifteen thousand words an hour seems to be excessive; over the period required it is doubtful whether a rate of more than twelve thousand words an hour could be sus-

tained. So, at five hours a day and six days a week, it will take at least fifteen weeks to read and will cost at least twenty-seven pounds (not nine weeks and twenty pounds as I stated). The other figures should be adjusted to correspond.

Mr Cordes' quarrel is not really with me, but with the laws of arithmetic. (Incidentally, it was the writer, and not the readers, of Dr Barth's works who I suggested might have to answer for their length on the day of judgment.) Had we but world enough and time, this logorrhea were no crime, when yonder all before us lie deserts of Barth's theology. The question is not whether Dr Barth's books are worth reading but whether he is justified in making the demands which he does on his readers' time.

We might perhaps suppose that it would be sufficient to read the English translation of Dr Otto Weber's *Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics*, if we could steel our nerves against the incessant exclamation marks with which that book is studded, since Dr Barth himself has guaranteed its accuracy. But no. "I certainly do not require anyone to speak well or ill of me; nor do I really insist that a man must read me at all. But if anyone wishes to speak about me, he should have at least read me. That is not too much to ask. Moreover (if he is a serious person and not a journalist, and therefore not a theologian who thumbs through a book), he should have read me completely." Thus Dr Barth in his foreword to Dr Weber's book. There is thus nothing else for it; before we can criticize Dr Barth we must read not only the whole of the *Church Dogmatics* but all his other books as well. The *Dogmatics* alone will take us fifteen weeks at least; will five months be enough for the whole task? Has any writer ever made such a claim upon the public?

Once again, this is a sheer matter of arithmetic. It is well known that it costs an author more time and trouble to write briefly than to write diffusively and repetitively, but in order to form a fair judgment we must multiply the time saved for each reader by the total number of readers. If by exercising a little self-restraint or by practising a little pruning an author can save each of his readers an hour's reading time, then, for every thousand readers that he has, the total time gained will be a thousand hours. In the mutual coinherence of the human race, there can be few investments that pay as high a rate of interest as this. I doubt whether there is any way in which an author can show his respect for his readers better than by doing all that is in his power to take up as little of their time as possible.

Mr Parker wonders how it is possible to estimate the degree of discursiveness of a book without having read it completely. There is a statistical method known as sampling. And it is a little hard to blame me for not knowing the number of volumes in the *Dogmatics* when, as Mr Cordes has pointed out, its author does not yet know it himself.

Yours faithfully,
E. L. Mascall.

Christ Church,
Oxford.

BUDDHISM TO-DAY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I was much interested in the article on the appeal of Buddhism to modern man in your September issue. Mr Gray is right in asking that the grounds of this appeal be fully realized; but I cannot agree with his main contention that the attraction of Buddhism in the West or in the East is derived from its doctrinal teaching.

In the West it cannot be denied that Buddhist doctrines do appeal to some when they come into contact with them for the first time. But this is not because Christian doctrine has been examined and found less attractive, but because it had never been understood aright at all. Very few European Buddhists were convinced Christians before their conversions to Buddhism.

"The nemesis of a religion which loses its hold on the great commonplaces of existence is commonly not indifference but a counter-religion", wrote R. H. Tawney; and the revival of Buddhism in the East certainly bears testimony to this truth, while in the West the decline of Christianity has left a void which any sub-Christian philosophy can easily fill.

In Ceylon, which is the land to which I belong, it is certainly true to say that the Buddhist revival, unlike all Christian revivals, has not originated in a renewed interest in scripture and doctrine or in an attempt to relate them to the world in which we live. Buddhist publications and newspapers seldom show any lively interest in Buddhist teaching; they are more concerned with the Christian Church and its failings. In Asian universities, for instance, there is very little real interest in the Buddhist tenets. The Buddhist Commission in Ceylon which issued its report, entitled the "Betrayal of Buddhism", was more concerned with the "Betrayal" which it alleged had taken place in the past under Western rule than with the rediscovery of Buddhist truths.

Is it too much, then, to contend that what passes for a Buddhist revival in Asia is mainly a popular reaction against the poor witness of the Asian Churches, which seem so alien, and the Church in the West, which seems so unfaithful to Christian ideals?

In almost all Asian countries Christians are alienated from the rest of their countrymen not only by their religious beliefs, but by their preferences in language and dress, the social position and economic means they enjoy, their political loyalties, and their tastes in art and music which they display both in secular life and in worship. These factors together make it impossible for most Christians to be even on talking terms with fellow-nationals.

The poverty of the witness of the Church in the West is no less responsible for the Buddhist revival. To the Asian the white man has been and will for a long time remain a Christian. But can he be blamed for this misconception? During the last war the Services in Asia conducted themselves sometimes immorally, but often, to say

the least, unusually by Asian standards; they undid the work of many hundreds of missionaries. The truth about "Christian England", which was slowly being disclosed by some English residents in Asia, was fully exposed by them. The result has been disastrous to Christianity.

Many people in Asia are more vitally concerned in politics, both national and international, than is generally appreciated; and unfortunately for the Christian Church British foreign policy is taken to be an expression of the Christian attitude to other nations. This seems fantastic; but all the same it remains true that war, H-bombs, and the use of force by the Western powers to settle international disputes make the missionary task of the Church not only in Asia but all the world over immensely more difficult.

Asia is turning to Buddhism not because its teaching attracts them, but because Christians and their Church repel them.

Yours, etc.,

KENNETH FERNANDO.

CUDDESDON COLLEGE,
OXFORD.
15 *September* 1956.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES. By Edward Duff, S.J. Longmans. 25s.

The first reaction of a member of one of the Reformed Churches to this compilation may well be a slightly nettled surprise that a Jesuit should have barged in first and written it. True, it is only eight years since the World Council of Churches was born (after a long and troubled gestation) and its own supporters may have thought a later date would be better for attempting to assess its voluminous work in the sphere of social prophylaxis. Or is it not more likely that there are too few persons within this consortium of churches—from which Roman Catholics almost alone exclude themselves—who have seen the actual and potential significance of what this book describes in so vivid an historical light as Fr Duff doubtless brought to bear upon it? One remembers that the tradition in which he was trained started as one of the ecumenical movements of the Tridentine period!

Anyway, the work is admirably done. The writer brings a most sympathetic understanding to the deeply Christian motives which produced the World Council out of a confluence of three distinct movements—those of the alliance in the Mission field, the World Student Christian Federation, and "the Social Gospel". As one might expect, he ends by saying that there is a connexion between the sometimes rather dishevelled ideas with which the Council approached the social question and its unavoidably a-cephalic ecclesiology; he avers that for this reason a synthesis of its Social Thought is not really possible. But, in point of fact, Fr Duff's synoptic

account of the Council's work in this field presents it with a coherence and significance which may pleasantly surprise some of us who have followed its conferences from within as well as without. From the huge and bewildering mass of printed and mimeographed proceedings, Fr Duff has extracted the essential with discernment and competence as well as astonishing industry; he has succeeded in elucidating, to a great extent, the pattern of conflicting tendencies, or emphases, which have recurred throughout the ecumenical debates upon the secular order. Ecumenical thinkers who have been often wearied or disheartened by the efforts to promote common understanding and action in this field may find encouragement—though hardly relaxation—by ploughing through this book, for after all it shows that the arguments from opposing points of view do not cancel each other out.

Upon the essential principles of a Christian society, there emerges from this survey a substantial consensus of judgment; it is the variety of reasons for which the judgments are held which is confusing. To keep them connected upon theological common ground was, one feels, a task in which the British contribution was specially valuable, though it was not otherwise the most brilliant. In this comprehensive context one sees better than before, for instance, the value of Dr Oldham's early formulation of "our deepest differences" in terms of the "ethic of inspiration" as contrasted with the "ethic of ends"; and also of Archbishop Temple's plea for "the middle axioms" which can connect the pure principles of the Christian ethic with the complexities of an actual historic situation in which action has to be taken. This was an approach which did something to by-pass the resistance always aroused in the stricter schools of Protestant opinion by any direct appeal to the tradition of Natural Law.

The book shows, besides the philosophical difficulties of an effective *rapprochement*, some of the obstacles created by immediate political situations, which have often been insuperable. It is really a wonder that conferences between such bodies in such circumstances could ever come to conclusions as significant as those listed in Fr Duff's final *Summary of Achievements*. As to the wider influence of the Council's social thinking, it is much more likely to be underthan over-estimated. At the height of the activity of this organization, its social deliberations helped to foster, and also derived prestige from, its very practical promotion of works of inter-church aid and refugee relief. Since these corporal works of mercy have become less urgent, there has been a decline in the amount of social discussion it has sponsored—due, Fr Duff suspects, to "a general falling-off of interest to-day in theories about society". He quotes Professor Alfred Cobban's "ominous" opinion that this may reflect "a feeling that ethical values have no place in the field of social dynamics and power politics".

If that be so, all the greater is the need for going on with this work of the World Council of Churches. For in so far as it is true that "ethical values" are impotent in politics the moral for Christians is not to retire from the fray, but through prayer and work to become

the living and material power they ought to be. Their ability to influence secular policy has always depended upon the amount of temporal power that has accrued to them and their institutions—not by their grasping at position or wealth but rather by their holding these of no account compared with work for the love of God and man, until one day even material power is added unto them. But the capacity to use it still depends upon an up-to-date understanding of their society, which means a lot of hard work, much of it of the same nature as this treatise reports. Not very many people may fully appreciate the worth of Fr Duff's initiative; but for those who do, it will remain, unless superseded, an indispensable work of reference.

Philip Mairet.

London.

Sexual Offenders and Social Punishment. Edited and compiled by D. Sherwin Bailey. Church Information Board. 6s. 6d.

This small book includes the complete evidence submitted on behalf of the Church of England Moral Welfare Council to the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, together with, as the title-page has it, "other material relating thereto".

The decision by the Council to appoint a group to consider the problems of homosexuality and prostitution arose partly out of the interest provoked by an article in this journal (February 1952). Dr Sherwin Bailey, Study Secretary of the Church of England Moral Welfare Council, has compiled and edited the results of the group's work, which was carried out under the guidance of the late Canon Hugh Warner, then Education Secretary of the Council. Dr Bailey has, in addition, contributed to this volume the essence of some of his own research on these problems, which he submitted as personal evidence to the Departmental Committee. The "other material" referred to above also includes a summary of the present state of the law relating to homosexual offences and prostitution. The terms of reference of the Departmental Committee restrict it to a review of the law, but the Council has considered the problems from a much wider viewpoint, and its findings and recommendations are of great interest and importance to all concerned with these serious social issues.

Homosexuality is the problem which occupies the major part of the report, and the most impressive point made is its insistence on the clear distinction between homosexuality as such and homosexual practices. The former is a condition which in itself is not susceptible to moral judgment, so that the invert may and should be helped to come to terms with himself and to lead a socially and sexually blameless life. Homosexual acts, on the other hand, whether practised by genuine inverts or others, are always morally to be condemned and,

in certain limited circumstances, should be legally punishable. Such a distinction is not commonly drawn, with the result that social attitudes to inverts are often confused by unnecessary harshness or sentimentality.

The discussion of homosexuality in this report is unfortunately weakened by its exclusive concentration on the male invert. It seems a pity that the Council, while deploring the double standard by which the law takes no account of female homosexual behaviour, should itself give the impression of the same attitude by making no more than a passing reference to female inversion. Surely the gravity of a problem is not to be assessed by its magnitude or its obviousness.

In dealing with prostitution it is clear that the Council has less hope of any real alteration in social attitudes, and therefore of any lessening of the problem, without a basic change in the whole approach to sexual matters. There appears to be little prospect of such a change, and prostitution remains one of the most stubbornly entrenched of social ills. Increased State interference, the report suggests, would be likely only to entrench it still deeper.

It is probable that the Home Secretary's decision to appoint the Departmental Committee was at least indirectly influenced by the Moral Welfare Council's raising of the issues. It will be interesting to see how far the Committee's report is similarly influenced, but publication is not expected before next year.

Rosemary Hughes.

Bromley.

The Early Church. By Oscar Cullmann. S.C.M. Press. 25s.

The Strangeness of the Church. By Daniel Jenkins. The Christian Faith Series. Gollancz. 12s. 6d.

Professor Cullmann's shorter historical and theological studies, of which we have here a representative collection, should command the same respect as his major works. The first in order, entitled "The Necessity and Function of Higher Criticism", is the author's apologia for his own approach, amply illustrated in the later essays, towards a theological exegesis which is unfailingly rooted in the disciplines of critical scholarship.

An attractive example of this method, which should provide magnificent material for sermons in the seasons of Christmas and Epiphany, is the second essay which researches into the origins of these festivals. There are contributions to Johannine scholarship in essays VII and IX, of particular interest being the conjecture that the "others" of John 4. 38 are the Hellenists who are recorded in Acts as having first preached the word in Samaria. Many of the other essays would seem to underline and document the theme of *Christ and Time.*

The *pièce de résistance,* deserving the closest attention, is undoubtedly Essay IV, entitled "The Tradition". This has already

appeared, as originally drafted, in two articles in *The Scottish Journal of Theology*. The author has now combined and revised these in the light of discussion with Roman Catholic scholars.

We have here an examination of the concept of Tradition in relation to Scripture. While it is conceded that there is a proper place for Tradition and even a *paradosis* within the apostolic witness itself, the primacy of Scripture is defended. The keystone of the argument is the interpretation of the Pauline *ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου* as referring both to the Tradition mediated through the apostolic Church and to the living Lord who is the ever-present creator and controller of the Tradition. It is this double reference with but a single source, the same "Lord the Spirit" being originator of both event and interpretation, which sets the apostolic writings apart and justified the Church of the patristic age in canonizing them as a norm superior to its own contemporary teaching.

While one may agree that the case stands as thus presented, one may also venture to comment that in this conversation with the Romans, who are pledged to the inerrancy both of Scripture and the authoritative Tradition of the Church, Professor Cullmann seems at some points to fail to give full value to the complexity of the matter, even though his essay reveals it to be complex enough. He says nothing, for instance, of the fact that much of the New Testament which the Church supposed had been written by apostles or their followers is by way of being a sub-apostolic nimbus around a central apostolic constellation. Again, what precisely is the difference in authority between the teaching of Paul, whose claim to apostleship rests on his admittedly post-ascensional vision of the risen Christ, and the later teaching of the Church, which also claims to be "apostolic", under the guidance of the living Lord and indwelt by the Spirit? The question is particularly cogent where Pauline (or, for that matter, Johannine) teaching appears to differ from or go beyond that of the more primitive stratum of apostolic *kerygma* or *didache*. Or, to voice an even more pointed question, in view of the author's Roman friends: do Protestant theologians receive as authoritative the theology (Christological, soteriological, eschatological) of the Petrine sermons in Acts, except in regarding it as the highly significant first stage in a long development?

The author's failure to deal adequately with such questions may be due to a dangerous tendency to belittle the human element in the New Testament record in contradistinction from its divine inspiration. There is an ominous sentence concerning the witess of the apostles: "The human element is here reduced to an *inevitable minimum inherent in the very notion of a divine revelation to man*" (italics Cullmann's). Perhaps we should do well, while accepting the main thesis that the apostolic revelation is a complex of history and inspired interpretation by those who were in crucial relation to that history, and admitting the New Testament canon to be normative as containing the primary documents of this revelation, nevertheless not to draw so tidy a distinction as he does between the apostolic Tradition and that of the later Church. It remains to say that the

translation leaves nothing to be desired, and the production of the book delights the eye.

Professor Jenkins's volume is one of "a new series of religious books, written in non-technical language"—to quote the publishers' statement on the dust cover. The comprehensiveness of the book, which deals with the Church in all its aspects in less than two hundred pages, inevitably involves slightness of treatment in parts and some one-sided judgments. But, taken as a whole, it is remarkably fair and restrained in its presentation of views other than the author's own and admirably positive in its basic theology of the Church.

The common factor which justifies reviewing both these books together (apart from the key-word "Church" in both their titles) is that they are in part the fruit of irenic conversation between their authors and theologians of other denominations. They can both claim their measure of significance in the ecumenical context.

T. S. Garrett.

Tirumaraiyur,
South India.

Tertullian's Tract on the Prayer: The Latin Text with Critical Notes, an English Translation and Explanatory Observations. By Ernest Evans. S.P.C.K. 12s. 6d.

Dr Evans is our leading English expositor of Tertullian, both on the side of text and language and on Tertullian's theology. In the present volume we have a work in which "the Introduction and Notes are not intended to be exhaustive. They will serve their purpose if they introduce to young students one of the most brilliant and versatile writers of Christian antiquity. . . ."

The *De Oratione* of Tertullian contains the earliest known commentary on the Lord's Prayer (Chs. 1–9), and a much longer section on private and public prayer and on innovations in current Christian practice (Chs. 10–29). The theme of the Lord's Prayer was soon to engage the attention of Cyprian also, and the latter's work *De Dominica Oratione* shows how much he is a follower of his famous or notorious predecessor whose "riddling epigrams" he wrote out "in limpid sense" (Benson, *Cyprian*, p. 270). Many have thought that Tertullian's work is a sermon: if the whole of it is a sermon, the general effect is of a somewhat rambling disquisition in which the author touches on a number of topics, some of which he treated at greater length elsewhere, or even made the subject of a separate treatise (*De Virginibus Velandis*).

Multum obscurus, wrote Lactantius, *inter alia*, of Tertullian, and that judgment is an apt one with reference to the *De Oratione* (and cf. Benson, quoted above). It is this obscurity that makes one doubt whether this work, notwithstanding the importance and attractiveness of its subject, is a good introduction for the "young students" to whom Dr Evans refers. In the scanty manuscript tradition there are

many passages that border on unintelligibility, and Dr Evans is to be congratulated on his elucidation of these and on his determination to try to make the text yield sense; he has exposed the folly of some earlier efforts at emendation, and has made a dozen or so suggestions of his own for text or punctuation: these suggestions are well worth while in general. It will be understood that, from the state of the text, anyone who attempts to translate the *De Oratione* has a difficult task. Dr Evans's translation is on the whole successful: the present reviewer has noted about ten cases in which he prefers Souter's version.

Dr Evans has made a great part of his "explanatory observations" linguistic ones. As his commentary runs to only 20 pages in all, general subjects are somewhat sketchily treated. It would be unfair to compare this slender volume with the *magnum opus* of Diercks (written, unfortunately for most of us, in Dutch), but one must point out that sometimes, e.g. in Chs. 26–28, there is practically no commentary at all—the apocryphal *Vidisti fratrem etc.*, surely deserves quite more than a general remark (cf. e.g. Souter ad loc.). It is also to be noted that if one compares Dr Evans's work with the points concerning the *De Oratione* on which F. H. Chase fastened in *The Lord's Prayer in the Early Church*, there is practically no comment, even on the gender of *malus* in *Devehe nos a malo* (cf. Chase, pp. 134–6). Another point is that the *De Oratione* is not sufficiently put into what one may call its "Tertullianic" setting. This is clear if one looks at the edition of R. W. Muncey (1926) which is packed with cross-references to other works of Tertullian. Dr Evans could have done all this for us—and that without producing a commentary on the scale of Diercks—and it is a pity that he did not do so.

J. Stevenson.

Downing College,
Cambridge.

Kierkegaard Commentary. By T. H. Croxall. Nisbet. 25s.

Meditations from Kierkegaard. By T. H. Croxall. Nisbet. 12s. 6d.

The extraordinary mind of Kierkegaard is like a garden of vast luxuriance , and amongst the many who have assayed to make known its beauty and variety none is more deserving of praise than Dr Croxall. The extent of the domain is in terms of the fourteen volumes of the Works and the twenty volumes of the Papers. The Meditations which we are offered draw largely on the Papers, much of which remain untranslated, and in the Commentary also Dr Croxall not only makes use of the existing translations but often improves on them or offers a new rendering. This enthusiastic student of Kierkegaard has the advantage of being a master of the Danish language and has lived in the country and had rich contact with its scholars. While the Meditations will help the reader to appreciate the deeply devotional side of Kierkegaard, his essential Christianity, the Commentary provides most useful interpretation and explanation. It cannot be gainsaid that a superficial study of

Kierkegaard's writing may lead more to bewilderment than enlightenment—his love of mystification, his complicated use of pseudonymity, his existential approach to truth in which knowledge of his life is essential all contribute to the difficulty of evaluation.

In this task Dr Croxall is of the greatest help. He does not unduly obtrude himself and discuss Kierkegaard's thought in general terms, but he keeps close to the text of the more important books, with such elucidation as is necessary, and so reconstructing the argument as to enable the reader to approach this great garden with proper appreciation of its flora.

It is astonishing to study the so-called "gloomy Dane" and to find not only devotional depth but flashes of humour, magnificent irony, and a quarry from which seems to have been hewn so much of the thought of our own day, both philosophical and theological.

Here we can find the material for the vocabulary of both Barth and Bultmann, such key-words as "Incognito" and "Contemporaneity" and "Inwardness". One has only to read Marcel or Berdyaev, Heidegger or Sartre, and the Danish Master looms large behind them with his emphasis on Subjectivity and Existence. Above all, he represents the first great battle against Hegelianism, against the purely immanentist approach to religion, against what he calls "religion A", and his attack on the Danish Church of his day, though it may have been one-sided, and we are grateful to Dr Croxall for including in his Commentary Bishop Martensen's reply, still has its relevance and challenge.

The Meditations are under five headings—For Times and Seasons (from Advent to Trinity), the Sermon on the Mount, Some Biblical Personalities, the Parables and Miracles of Jesus, and a general section. Each selection ends with a prayer, either the words of Kierkegaard himself or an adaptation of his words. Kierkegaard never wished to address the world, but he seeks "that individual . . . who in the quietness of his heart will listen to a message that is personal and subjective, not general and objective . . .". In an age like ours where so many find themselves disillusioned, where the uncommitted "aesthetic" life leads to a very Kierkegaardian despair, there will be many who will hear his call to make the Leap, but to what? To Christianity? It involves paradox, what Kierkegaard called "the absurd", going out "upon 70,000 fathoms of water". It is an appeal to the Individual. Kierkegaard has been accused of being "antisocial", and yet his emphasis on the Individual may well be a necessary corrective in the age of the mass man and the demand for individual self-surrender may be the prior claim if our social relationships are to be healthy. In this age of anxiety Kierkegaard may not, as Dr Croxall admits, be the only pebble on the beach, but he is nevertheless not a pebble but a rock indeed. If we take together the message of two who were contemporary—Kierkegaard and Maurice, both against the tide, both misunderstood—how complementary is the word of one to the other and how profoundly they speak to our need.

Bangalore. L. M. Schiff.

SHORTER NOTICES

THEY SPEAK BY SILENCES. By a Carthusian. (Translated from the French by a Monk of Parkminster.) Longmans. 7s. 6d.

All we are told about the author of these thoughts and meditations is that he died in 1945, having held various positions of authority in the Carthusian Order. From the interior of his silence he speaks to us about reality, which is the grace of God, a reality on which he helps us to ground our faith amid our worry and ferment of feelings, our difficulties, suffering and weakness. This weakness can become God's opportunity, for he is Love, he gives himself. This book is the fruit of the author's prayer: many will find in it the stimulus for their own.

ELY. VICTOR DE WAAL.

DIE OKUMENISCHE BEWEGUNG UND DIE EINHEIT DER KIRCHE. By T. Sartory, O.S.B. Meitingen bei Augsburg, Kyrios Verlag. N.p.

A steady stream of literature on the Ecumenical Movement has come from the pens of sympathetic continental Roman Catholics in recent years. One of the most important of such studies is the doctoral thesis which Dom Thomas Sartory has recently presented to the University of Munich. Dom Sartory is well known as one of the leaders of the *Una Sancta* movement in Germany, a fact which prepares us for the careful and sympathetic treatment which the subject receives at his hands.

The first part of the book gives an historical sketch of the Ecumenical Movement, in the modern sense of the term, up to the Lund Conference of 1952. The emphasis is a little one-sided, since the author is more concerned with questions of Faith and Order than with Life and Work. But the sketch is remarkably well done, though Dom Sartory has made use of the standard *History of the Ecumenical Movement*. This section of the book ends with a particularly instructive chapter on "Rome and the Ecumenical Movement", in which the reactions of the Churches which compose the World Council to the various Vatican decisions are very fully and fairly set forth and some misconceptions are cleared away.

The second half of the book is the more interesting. In it Dom Sartory deals in a systematic way with the various ideas which are implied by a doctrine of Church unity and reunion. He has read widely in Protestant literature, and always presents the Protestant case with sympathy and scrupulous fairness.

This is a book which should be widely studied by all who are concerned with Christian unity, whether within the Ecumenical Movement or outside it. The volume is very well produced, but the text is marred by a great number of misprints, some English quotations being rendered quite unintelligible.

HENRY R. T. BRANDRETH, O.G.S.

PARIS.

The School of Self-Knowledge. Mowbray. 3s.

St Aelred on Jesus at Twelve Years Old. Mowbray. 3s. 6d.

Consider Him. By Olive Wyon. S.C.M. Press. 3s. 6d.

The Marks of the Blessed. By H. P. Greaves. Faith Press. 4s.

"Every scribe . . . is like unto . . . a householder which bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old." Mowbray's Fleur de Lys series should need no commendation in bringing us the wisdom of the past. Philosophies and fashions in exegesis may change, but these works can provide us with a fund of biblical and other illustrations. Miss Wyon's meditations on the Passion should need no bush. Mr Greaves on the Beatitudes finds us many opportunities for sanctity in the commonplace and should be useful to those who are trying to live the Christian life in the busy world of to-day.

George Braund, O.G.S.

Cambridge.

The Shrine of Our Lady of Walsingham. By J. C. Dickinson. Cambridge University Press. 18s.

Here is a scholarly compilation of such facts about the Priory of Walsingham as can be culled from State Papers and other official documents. The history of the shrine and priory occupies the first half of the book. The second, which is entitled "Archaeological", is a history of the building in which William of Worcester's description is considered, and the remaining buildings, together with such excavations as have from time to time been made, are discussed. Chapter Six deals with seals, statue and pilgrim's badges, and then follows the fascinating "Pynson Ballad", a 15th-century work of fifteen stanzas which sets out the story of the founding of the Priory and Holy House.

Mr Dickinson's book is a valuable piece of sober history. We are glad to know the facts about Walsingham and should be grateful to him for setting them out in a book of a hundred and fifty pages. On the other hand, I cannot help feeling that the book hardly does justice to the life and colour that most certainly was and, indeed, again is to be found at Walsingham. We are told of what Walsingham was and are presented with an effect unique in medieval England, but not nearly enough is said about the cause. It might be argued that that cause was a dream, but, none the less, it was the cause which led directly to the development of the cult of Our Lady of Walsingham. If the writer is unwilling to commit himself too far in what we may call the theological implications of the shrine, then at least it would have been preferable to print the "Pynson Ballad" at the beginning of the book rather than reserving it for an Appendix. The ballad expresses medieval belief in medieval language. It is something very much alive. Because men and women believed this they built Walsingham, and because Walsingham satisfied the spiritual aspiration of the time men and women flocked there. We

may or may not agree with what went on and goes on again at Walsingham, but at least we must reckon with it. Walsingham is not a subject that can be approached with caution, for it simply cannot be understood by an exercise of that quality. Its devotion may be exotic but it is none the less real in its effects, and I have the feeling that, whereas this book is quite happily concerned with the outcomes of those effects, it is extremely "cagey" concerning their causes. Here, at any rate, are the facts about Walsingham; and if you want more, why then, you must follow the example of countless thousands who

"With hoked staues,
Wenten to Walsyngham."

NOEL BOSTON.

EAST DEREHAM.

WHAT ABOUT YOU? By George Reindorp. Hodder and Stoughton. 4s. 6d.

CALL TO DUTY. By Joost de Blank. Oxford University Press. 5s.

Mr Reindorp's book deserved better of his publishers than to be given so tedious a description as "here at last in a book on ——". Fortunately its jacket also carries a most engaging photograph of presumably the author, be-cloaked and umbrella-ed, looking up in greeting at a parishioner at one of the higher windows of a block of flats. The quality of the contents fulfils the promise of this photograph. Their nature and variety will be indicated by some of the chapter headings—"Who was Jesus Christ?", "What Faith Means", "Why the Church?", "Forms and Ceremonies", "Meditation", "Conscience", "Set Yourself a Standard", and there is a particularly good and pastorally penetrating section on "A Christian's Marriage". Mr Reindorp possesses that rare gift, a convincingly conversational style, and this, together with its obvious relevance to the lives of those for whom it is written, should render *What About You?* digestible to the many to whom, as every parish priest knows, it is hopeless to recommend in literary form a more solid diet than such admirable snacks as these. They will absorb, with just that amount of mental mastication that may be hoped for, a great deal of real nourishment. Those too, whose task it is to feed them, may learn much here about making an untrivial menu appetizing. Trivial it certainly is not, and it is one of the happier signs of the times that theology should thus penetrate a field that was lately so largely given over to sentiment.

The Bishop of Stepney writes in a less light-hearted and more hortative vein. With a book that is a commentary on The Short Guide to the Duties of Church Membership, issued by the Archbishops of Canterbury and York at the request of the Church Assembly, this was inevitable. It is not unimportant that this Short Guide has lost on the way a significant expression with which it started life as a progeny of the Lambeth Conference of 1948. Then it was "Membership of Christ in the Church" of which it spoke. Now

we are only members of the Church. Thus an emphasis, which is most necessary, and which gave at least a hint of invigorating conversion to an otherwise not particularly invigorating document, has gone by the board. Yet there are those to whom, having first warned them of the inadequacy of a merely exemplarist Christ, the discriminating parish priest may give the Short Guide to the Duties of Church Membership. *Call to Duty* will provide them with a useful exposition of it. They will be a different type of people from those to whom Mr Reindorp's book will be recommended, but that may be all to the good. Sheer worthiness is an unexciting virtue which we have been underestimating, and it is to this that the bishop, by the very task to which he set himself in this book, committed himself to speak.

FRANK BENNETT.

MAIDSTONE.

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. By Vincent Taylor. Epworth Press. 8s. 6d.

The reviewer of commentaries on biblical books often asks himself the question, "For whom is the commentator writing?" When he tries to form his judgment he may feel that the writer had neither the scholar nor the student, neither the preacher nor the intelligent layman primarily in mind, and that such indecision has weakened the effectiveness of his book. No such query arises in connexion with the first volume of the new Epworth series. This new venture, a series of commentaries "written specifically for preachers, and particularly for those who feel themselves ill-equipped to study the more advanced works of scholarship", is to be applauded.

Those familiar with Dr Taylor's trilogy on the Atonement, and those who have grappled with his magisterial commentary on St Mark, will have no doubt of his capacity to comment on Romans. Within a hundred pages he has succeeded in giving brief and accurate expository comments on the text of the epistle, and he has prefaced the commentary with a short glossary of key Pauline words. Some would welcome enlargement of the treatment here, a shift in emphasis there; the section on "Spirit" in the glossary is weak; many find the Pauline argument strengthened if πίστις is sometimes translated "faithfulness", as in 1. 17 and 3. 22; the translation of Vol. I of Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament* has provided a more clarifying terminology for the theme of Justification; the modern preacher needs more guidance on St Paul's teaching on the incorporation of mankind in Adam and in Christ than is offered on p. 39. In general, however, there is much to be grateful for.

The tone of the book is a little dull; doubtless this is partly due to the author's need to compress. The preacher is left with much work to do, and that is all to the good. Dr Taylor has appended to each section "a paragraph in which the principal themes are indicated and in some cases discussed". The General Editor of the series states that each writer will have freedom to choose his own method

of approach; later writers will certainly want to depart from Dr Taylor's approach in these sections. Where he has gone beyond a bare summary of the leading themes, he makes some excellent suggestions; but he has been all too sparing at these points. Would it be possible for each commentator in the series to devote four or five pages to showing how he would expound a central passage of his book to a contemporary congregation?

Derek W. Allen.

St Stepen's House,
Oxford.

The Old Testament since the Reformation. By Emil G. Kraeling. Lutterworth Library—Vol. XLVII. 27s. 6d.

Dr Kraeling has accomplished a colossal task. He here summarizes the varied approaches made to the problem of the O.T. by every Reformed theologian of note (not merely every O.T. scholar) since Luther and Calvin. This program has involved him in expounding a wide range of general theological, philosophical and even political ideas: and often this is magnificently done, as in the chapter on the Dialectic Theology (pp. 164 ff.). Generous consideration of writers who only echoed the original contributions of greater minds makes much of the book repetitious; but what it loses as a profile, it gains as a work of reference. It will be of the greatest value not only to scholars but to all who take seriously the honest preaching of Scripture. The annotated bibliography alone (especially to readers of German) is worth a lot.

The problem of the O.T., in the author's own words and as it emerges from his survey, is this: "Should it have any authority in the Christian Church and if so how is that authority to be defined?" Is it lower in value than the N.T.? or different and complementary? Is it just a history book, a record of the *praeparatio evangelii*, or does it meet us still with a decisive spiritual challenge? If so, what of the unworthy ideas of God and man that it contains, and what criteria do we use to distinguish these from the eternal and true? What of its racial, Oriental limitations in a world-religion?

Reformed scholars have tackled these questions with inspiring courage and persistence. Dr Kraeling condenses their answers comprehensively and accurately and brings out the many background influences that affected (and often marred) their efforts.

The author offers no personal suggestions for a solution. Nothing could be more unfair than to blame an author for not supplying what he never proposed nor claimed to be able to supply. Dr Kraeling, however, so freely allows himself criticisms (not always fair, but regularly provoking!) which throw over individual solutions and sometimes whole schools of thought at once, that by the end the reader is sure he has some positive alternative in mind. But while observing to-day "on all sides a drift toward the normative", he excludes the possibility of there being "a happy ending to this development". It is the "current" of thought that is significant in

itself. Possibly: but had the writers he reviews taken this line, the better part of his book would never have existed. It is just the vision of a possible "happy ending", a final far completeness, that gives all creative theology its momentum.

JOHN BAKER.

CUDDESDON COLLEGE.

ST THOMAS AQUINAS: THEOLOGICAL TEXTS. Edited and translated with notes by Thomas Gilby. Oxford University Press. 15s.

No doubt the whole idea of a selection of texts from the enormous range of St Thomas's writings will strike some as doubtful, quite as inappropriate (if not impossible) as a comic-strip of Shakespeare. The essence of St Thomas, they may say, cannot be displayed in a collection of 670 texts varying in length from several words to several paragraphs. It is the whole argument, the structure or even the architecture of his works, that is the important thing, not isolated fragments torn from their contexts.

There may be something in this view, but how sad it would be if it meant that some might deny themselves the pleasure of Fr Gilby's brilliantly conceived and executed volume. His success in doing the impossible is prodigious. It is due to the excellence of the translations, the penetration of his brief but always pertinent notes, his masterly grouping of the selections under ten major headings, and of course to the inexhaustible richness of the writings themselves. Even those readers who think they know their way about in St Thomas can hardly fail to find things which they have never read (or never noticed) before. And even, *per impossible*, should they find nothing new, the unfamiliar arrangement of the texts is in itself a delight. It leads to renewed reflection, sometimes in surprisingly "un-thomist" ways. A most useful feature of the book (apart from the excellent index) is the system of cross-references. It is based not simply upon verbal resemblances, but upon the editor's insight into the inner connexions of St Thomas's thought. Superficially dissimilar remarks throw great light upon each other.

This is a book to be referred to—we may even begin to hear quotations from St Thomas in Anglican sermons—but more than that to be enjoyed.

H. E. ROOT.

EMMANUEL COLLEGE,
CAMBRIDGE.

FAITH AND CULTURE. By Bernard Meland. George Allen and Unwin. 12s. 6d.

Dr Meland's book deals with an important contemporary theme, the problem of reviving faith within Western culture in the "post-liberal" phase of theological development. He has been much influenced by recent findings in cultural anthropology and psychology, and theories of emergent and creative evolutionism.

The book is divided into three parts, entitled respectively "The Reconception of Faith", "The Dynamic of Culture" and "Faith and its Ultimate Issues". The last of these is easily the most valuable of the three and some things on the origin of evil and the ambiguity of human goodness are well said.

The first part is as prodigal of generalization as it is parsimonious in the matter of illustration. The word "culture", though it is part of the title of the book, is never properly defined and does not even occur in the index! Generally speaking, a more generous definition of terms in a work which moves within the four spheres of anthropology, psychology, philosophy and theology would have made for more clarity. In addition, Dr Meland wields a style which does not make the reader's task easier. Words, such as "structure", are constantly over-worked in an irritating manner, and there are other stylistic faults. There are, of course, writers who in spite of their lack of clearness stimulate the imagination by a certain power of suggestion. This cannot be said of Dr Meland.

And what *theologically* can be made of utterances such as the following? "God is viewed as a Creative Event in history bent on qualitative attainment, a sensitive nature within nature winning the creative passage for qualitative emergence" (p. 126). Or, "Christ is the exemplification of the concrete work of God in history, possibly (*sic*) the clearest; the clearest within Western history without any doubt" (p. 85). "Christ as the summit of the cultural creation of the West is the focal point of the Christian myth" (p. 86). Finally, "As Christian language has employed this term the Holy Spirit is the immediate working of the concrete nature of God. In it (*sic*) is the actual working of God in human life" (p. 199).

Dr Meland gives evidence of wide reading in many fields, has already written a number of books himself and is a Professor of Chicago University. It is a pity that the present work seeks to cover too much ground in too much of a hurry. And in these days can one refer so extensively to "myth" and "history" without so much as a glance at Rudolf Bultmann?

O. Fielding Clarke.

St James' Hospital,
Balham.

St Augustine: The Problem of Free-will. Translation and notes by Dom Mark Pontifex. (No. 22 in the series *Ancient Christian Writers*.) Longmans. 30s.

The reader has here a careful and readable rendering of the *De libero arbitrio*. A few long notes essay to help him appraise, in general against Thomist standards, Augustine's argument on the origin of evil, his epistemology, proof of the existence of God, relation to Plotinus, concept of *form*, and notions of divine foreknowledge, eternal punishment, the devil, and the origin of souls. Notes directly on the text are few and slight. The reader is left to appreciate Augustine's meaning, as far as he can do so, from English that

is crisp and reads well. But it is, alas! too easy to traverse such pages with the eye, and end quite uncertain how much has been gained. There is something to be said for a running commentary in short notes. To take an example at random, look at Section 48 of Book III. Evodius has just asked a really probing question. "Free-will being common to all men, how does it result in the division of the race into three classes?" (If all men sometimes willed right and sometimes wrong, there would be no question. Evodius' difficulty arises from the fact of saints and scoundrels.) Augustine's true answer should have turned on the selective character of grace. Instead we receive a purely debating answer. "Suppose I found you a cause for this trinal division, you would then want the cause of that cause, and so on, *ad infinitum*." But since Evodius had given a clear reason for looking for a cause "behind" free-will, the retort is hardly deserved. Next Augustine appeals to 1 Tim. 6. 10, but renders *philargyria* by *avaritia*, on the ground that *philargyria* is used in a broad metaphorical sense, as the equivalent of *avaritia*. But next he makes "avarice" equivalent to the wanton will of the creature that will not be content with God's will. All this is for the sake of claiming the support of the word "root" in 1 Tim. 6. 10, for his contention that when the source of evil has been traced to the freedom of creature wills, the search is at an end. Evodius has thus been handed off, rather than answered.

When Dom Mark Pontifex, instead of rendering Augustine's *avaritia*, gives the citation in the form "The desire of money is the root of all evil", he makes it hard for the English reader to trace the thread of the argument, or to see that the word "root" is the reason for dragging in this text.

Is it useful to read an argument rendered into English, if the odds are against the true nature of the argument being perceived? Or is it better that Augustine should remain obscure than be detected in sophistry? At least these translations drive us to ask such questions, and that is useful.

W. Telfer.

Faversham.

Canaanite Myths and Legends. By G. R. Driver. T. and T. Clark. 25s.

The discovery of the ancient Ugarit under the mound Ras Shamra in northern Syria was followed by ten years of excavation and study, beginning in 1929. The temple library and the royal archives yielded documents of great importance, in Akkadian, Sumerian, Hurrian, and (a new language) Ugaritic. At last an authoritative edition of the religious texts has been published for English readers. Professor Driver gives them all that can be desired: Introduction, texts transliterated and translated, learned notes, and even a glossary of Ugaritic words. Much has been written about the tablets, but now for the first time it is possible for the non-specialist reader to form his own conclusions; incidentally he can correct erroneous statements

which have had a vogue, such as the occurrence of Terah, Abraham's father, in the documents. We are given seven texts, some of considerable length, including Aqhat son of Danel (the hero of antiquity mentioned by Ezekiel as Daniel), Rephaim (the "shades" of the Old Testament), Hadad the Syrian weather-god, and, most important of all, Baal. The last seems to be the text-book of a ritual pantomime performed at a feast of first-fruits. If so, it is "the first authoritative picture of one of those Canaanite ceremonies to which the Old Testament so often refers in all too mysterious terms".

The importance of this book to the Bible student may be summed up thus. As the glossary shows, the Ugaritic language may be described as proto-Hebrew, an early form of the speech which the Hebrews adopted when they invaded Canaan. With the language they also took over the thought-forms, which were strongly tinged with Babylonian ideas. The religion portrayed is vivid and exciting, closely linked with everyday life, and must have had considerable attractive power. Apart from some frank animalism the myths are not too bad; indeed, modern eyes may view them with tolerance. The clash between Baalism and the stern moralism of Yahweh-religion at its best was epoch-making and helped to decide the future of the world. We can now do justice to the splendour of the Old Testament achievement. The documents are full of passages that illustrate the Bible. To give one example. Yahweh, the personal name of the Hebrew God, is undoubtedly found here. Yam-nahar ("Sea-River") is recognized by El, "the kindly white-haired old god who lives in heaven", and is renamed Yaw.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

Chichester.

The Intercessions of the Prayer Book. By E. C. Whitaker. S.P.C.K. Cloth, 6s. 6d.; paper, 3s. 6d.

This book provides in the first place a clear and brief study of the origins and history of the prayers to be read after the Third Collect, the Litany and the Prayer for the Whole State of Christ's Church. It may be commended as a useful handbook both for the theological student and the parish priest.

These historical researches are, however, only prolegomena to a discussion of the revision of the parts of the Prayer Book concerned. Many of the author's suggestions in detail are well considered and should command general consent. But there will be not a few readers who will beg to differ from his conservatism. That the wider range of choice in the 1928 book imposes upon the clergy "a responsibility far heavier than they ought to be made to bear" is a sorry admission. Surely it is their job to lead their people in prayer. Must Anglican intercession proceed for ever along well-worn tramlines in which almost the only place for the freedom of the Spirit is the liberty of the individual worshipper to "embroider" familiar public prayers with his private petitions? Should not the principle of respect for the natural conservatism of veteran Anglicans be counter-balanced

by an equally urgent consideration of the needs of the novice, for whom a sequence of well-chosen intercessions, unobscured by the Prayer Book's archaisms, may be the only part of the service that he readily understands?

T. S. GARRETT.

TAMILNAD THEOLOGICAL COLLEGE.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(*Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.*)

ALLEN AND UNWIN: F. H. Hilliard, *The Buddha, the Prophet and the Christ* (12s. 6.).

BLACKWELL: Leonard Hodgson, *For Faith and Freedom*, Vol. I (21s.).

GEOFFREY BLES: C. S. Lewis, *Till We Have Faces* (15s.).

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS: Bertram Colgrave, *Felix's Life of St Guthlac* (30s.).

EDINBURGH HOUSE PRESS: Jean Fraser, *Under the Cross* (5s.).

EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE: Daniel-Rops, *Jesus in His Time* [second, revised edition] (30s.).

FAITH PRESS: Marcus Donovan, *You and Your Conduct* (6s.).

INDEPENDENT PRESS: J. W. C. Wand, *Aspects of the Cross* (1s.).

INTER-VARSITY FELLOWSHIP: A. T. Houghton, *Preparing to be a Missionary* (3s.); Oliver R. Barclay, *Guidance* (1s.).

IONA COMMUNITY: T. Ralph Morton, *The Twelve Together* (7s. 6d.).

MACMILLAN: George Appleton (Ed.), *In His Name* (9s. 6d.).

MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION: James Parkes, *A Living Faith* (1s.).

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION PRESS: Norman J. Bull, *Man and his Society* (7s. 6d.).

ROCKLIFF: Arthur Brown, *The Fourth Gospel and the Eighteenth Degree* (21s.); H. L. Philp, *Freud and Religious Belief* (18s.).

ST ANDREW PRESS: W. R. Forrester, *Conversion* (1s. 6d.).

S.C.M. PRESS: S. L. Greenslade, *Early Latin Theology* (30s.).; Oscar Cullmann, *The Early Church* (25s.); Paul Tillich, *The New Being* (10s. 6d.); H. H. Rowley, *The Faith of Israel* (18s.); Herbert F. Hahn, *The Old Testament in Modern Research* (16s.); S. H. Hooke, *The Siege Perilous* (21s.); Helmer Ringgren, *The Messiah in the Old Testament* (7s. 6d.); John Bright, *Early Israel in Recent History Writing: A Study in Method* (9s. 6d.); Agnes Humphreys, *The Epistle of the Common Life* (6s.); L. E. Elliott-Binns, *Galilean Christianity* (7s. 6d.); H. G. G. Herklots, *Publicans and Sinners* (8s. 6d.).

S.P.C.K.: H. Spencer, *Islam and the Gospel of God* (3s.); G. L. Prestige, *St Basil the Great and Apollinaris of Laodicea* (12s. 6d.); J. M. Neale, *Some Principles of the Religious Life* (6s. 6d.).

THAMES AND HUDSON: Rudolf Bultmann, *Primitive Christianity in its Contemporary Setting* (18s.).

TYNDALE PRESS: A. Morgan Derham, *Shall these Things Be?* [about the Second Coming] (1s. 6d.); Donald Guthrie, *The Pastoral Epistles and the Mind of Paul* (1s. 6d.).

ZWINGLI-VERLAG (ZÜRICH): James M. Robinson, *Das Geschichtsverstandnis des Markus-Evangeliums* (Swiss fr. 14); Ernst Jenni, *Die politischen Voraussagen der Propheten* (Swiss fr. 14); Fritz Blanke, *Hamann-Studien* (Swiss fr. 16).

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BASIL BLACKWELL
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